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Abstract 
The German population's material standard of living during the 'peace 
years' of the Nazi regime (1933-38) is much debated.  We use hitherto 
disregarded consumption data and the axiom of revealed preferences to 
test whether the material standard of living improved.  We find that the 
food consumption bundle realized in 1935-36 must have been inferior to 
that of 1927-28 although GDP per capita was much higher.  Even in 1937-
38 consumers were probably worse off compared to 1927-28.  We 
conclude that increasing consumption constraints forced German 
consumers to a diet and thus to a material standard of living that were 
much more frugal than national income figures suggest. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the second half of the 1930s Germany experienced high economic growth rates and a 
rapid decline of unemployment that were unparalleled in Europe.  Contemporary 
observers, both inside and outside Germany, believed to witness a Wirtschaftswunder 
(economic miracle).1  Even after the defeat of the Nazi regime, Germany's economic policy 
received attention.  At a time when Keynesian ideas began to dominate the thinking of 
economic policy makers the apparent success of the Nazis' interventionist policies between 
1933 and 1939 was seen as a case study which might serve as a possible toolbox for 
democratic planners as well and was thus worth to be analyzed thoroughly.2   
It became quickly clear that the Nazi economic policy had, if at all, few to offer to 
democratic policy makers. Yet the assessment of its success has remained controversial.  
Some scholars followed the sceptical judgment of the Swiss economist René Erbe who 
showed that the economic upturn was accompanied by a reallocation of resources from 
consumer goods production to armaments production and was financed by enormous 
debts.3 
This view, which is by and large shared by most economic historians of Nazi Germany 
today, has proved to be difficult to reconcile with the fact that a clear majority of the 
German population approved the new regime.4  One argument that has been repeated ever 
since and which even today contemporary witnesses seldom fail to mention is that the 
improved provision of material goods contributed to this positive assessment of a 
                                                 
1  Cf. Hans E. Priester (1936), Das deutsche Wirtschaftswunder, Amsterdam: Querido; Wilhelm Prion (1938), 
Das deutsche Finanzwunder. Geldbeschaffung für den deutschen Wirtschaftsaufschwung, Berlin-Willmersdorf: 
Franke; Claude W. Guillebaud (1939), The Economic Recovery of Germany from 1933 to the Incorporation of 
Austria in March 1938, London: Macmillan. 
2  Cf., e.g., Guillebaud (1939), pp. 232f., 265; Otto Nathan and Milton Fried (1944), The Nazi Economic 
System. Germany's Mobilization for War, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. vi, 368; Samuel Lurié 
(1947), Private Investment in a Controlled Economy. Germany, 1933-1939, New York: Columbia 
University Press, p. vii.  See also Wesley C. Haraldson and Edward F. Denison (1946), The Gross National 
Product of Germany 1936-1944 (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Economic Effects 
Division, Special Paper 1), Washington, DC: mimeo; Burton Klein (1958), Germany's Economic 
Preparations for War, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. v. 
3  René Erbe (1958), Die nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik im Lichte der modernen Theorie (Basle Centre 
for Economic and Financial Research, B.2), Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag.  For a revisionist view 
concerning Germany’s indebtedness, see Albrecht Ritschl (2002), Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery: 
A Critical Reassessment, Journal of the Japanese and International Economy, 16, pp. 559-582. 
4  Cf. for quantitative evidence Karl-Heinz Reuband (2006), Das NS-Regime zwischen Akzeptanz und 
Ablehnung. Eine retrospektive Analyse von Bevölkerungseinstellungen im Dritten Reich auf der Basis 
von Umfragedaten, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 32, pp. 315-343. 
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murderous regime.  This contention found authoritative support by a study of the 
American economist Burton Klein who had served for the United States Strategic Bombing 
Survey under John K. Galbraith in the mid-1940s.  In his analysis of the German 
rearmament program of the 1930s he concluded that  
"in the prewar period, the German economy produced both 'butter' and 'guns' – 
much more of the former and much less of the latter than has been commonly 
assumed.  By 1937, civilian consumption, investment in consumer goods industries, 
and government nonwar expenditures equalled or exceeded previous peak levels. [...] 
Until 1936, rearmament and increased civilian consumption could be achieved 
simultaneously by drawing on unemployed resources.  Indeed, the rearmament 
deficits had a stimulating effect on consumption.  There was no conflict, therefore, in 
having both more 'butter' and more 'guns'.  In the years 1937 and 1938, however, the 
German economy was operating at near full employment, and a sizable increase in 
armament expenditures could have been achieved only at the expense of some decline 
in civilian consumption.  [...] It appears, however, that the German government was 
unwilling to ask for such sacrifices."5 
The findings of subsequent research on German agriculture were in line with this 
assessment.  The main subject of this research was the Reichsnährstand (Reich Food 
Corporation) founded by the Nazis in 1933 which was in charge of regulating German 
agricultural production and distribution and which soon started a much propagated 
Erzeugungsschlacht (battle for production).  Both John Farquharson and in particular 
Clifford R. Lovin argued that the Nazi agricultural policies were successful in augmenting 
food production and increasing national self-sufficiency.6   
These findings were taken up eagerly by historians when it came to a reassessment of the 
Nazi period in the course of the 'modernisation' debate.  At the core of the discussion was 
the question whether the Nazi regime was modern in the sense that it was in many respects 
not a deviation from larger 20th century trends.  In this context, a number of German 
historians emphasised in the 1980s that the standard of living increased considerably in the 
course of the 1930s.7  In a leading text book on the period, the historian Hans-Ulrich 
                                                 
5  Klein (1958), pp. 76, 79. 
6  Clifford R. Lovin (1969), Agricultural Reorganization in the Third Reich: The Reich Food Corporation 
(Reichsnährstand), Agricultural History, 43, pp. 447-461; John E. Farquharson (1976), The Plough and the 
Swastika: The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany 1928-45, London and Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 176f. 
7  Cf. Hans D. Schäfer (1981), Das gespaltene Bewußtsein. Über deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit 1933-
1945, Munich et al.: Hanser, pp. 116-119; Michael Prinz (1986), Vom neuen Mittelstand zum Volksgenossen. 
Die Entwicklung des sozialen Status der Angestellten von der Weimarer Republik bis zum Ende der NS-Zeit, 
Munich: Oldenbourg, pp. 187-196; idem (1994), Die soziale Funktion moderner Elemente in der 
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Thamer argues that among "the assets of the economic and social policies of the regime 
were the reduction of unemployment and the enhancement of the living standard".8 
This positive assessment of Nazi agricultural and consumption policies has recently found 
support by Werner Abelshauser and, in particular, by Götz Aly.  While Abelshauser is 
careful enough to note that "the German diet was remarkably modest", his provocative 
conclusion that the Nazis were "largely successful" in producing both "butter and guns" 
has evoked objections.9   
Following Erbe, Christoph Buchheim has termed the Nazi economic upturn "distorted 
growth".10  The discussion between Abelshauser and Buchheim illustrates a crucial 
problem in assessing the performance of Nazi economic policies which shows up in other 
comparative work on this period as well.  While Abelshauser compares the standard of 
living in the late 1930s with that of the trough of the crisis years, 1932 (as did the Nazi 
propaganda, official German statisticians and probably the common consumers of the 
1930s as well), Buchheim's reference period is the late 1920s when Germany's economy 
experienced a short – though financed by massive foreign debt inflow –economic boom.  
Thus his assessment of the material living standard in the second half of the 1930s is much 
more critical than Abelshauser's.   
Buchheim's stance is supported by the results of Jörg Baten and Andrea Wagner who have 
supplied evidence from social and medical data.  Whereas the biological standard of living 
improved in Western European countries during the 1930s, it stagnated in Germany.11  In 
addition, research on German agriculture has refuted the positive assessments of Lovin and 
Farquharson.  By comparing agricultural output and input of the 1930s with that of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Gesellschaftspolitik des Nationalsozialismus, in idem and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), Nationalsozialismus und 
Modernisierung, 2nd edn., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, pp. 297-327, here pp. 316f. 
8  Our translation from Hans-Ulrich Thamer (1998), Verführung und Gewalt. Deutschland 1933-1945, 3rd 
edn., Berlin: Siedler, p. 511 (first edition 1986). 
9  Werner Abelshauser (1998), Germany: Guns, Butter, and Economic Miracles, in Mark Harrison (ed.), The 
Economics of World War II. Six Great Powers in International Comparison, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 122-176, quotes pp. 147f.; idem (1999), Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftswunder. 
Deutschlands wirtschaftliche Mobilisierung für den Zweiten Weltkrieg und die Folgen für die 
Nachkriegszeit, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 47, pp. 503-538, here p. 525. 
10  Christoph Buchheim (2001), Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Dritten Reich – mehr Desaster als Wunder. 
Eine Erwiderung auf Werner Abelshauser, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 49, pp. 653-664; see also 
Mark Spoerer (2005), Demontage eines Mythos? Zu der Kontroverse über das nationalsozialistische 
"Wirtschaftswunder", Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 31, pp. 415-438. @Evtl. Buchheim (2010) einbauen? 
11  Jörg Baten and Andrea Wagner (2003), Autarchy, Market Disintegration, and Health: The Mortality and 
Nutritional Crisis in Nazi Germany, 1933-1937, Economics and Human Biology, 1, pp. 1-28. 
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first third of the 20th century, Gustavo Corni argued that the path of modernisation 
slowed down in the 1930s.12 This result has been confirmed by a total factor productivity 
analysis by Stephanie Degler and Jochen Streb who found that the TFP growth of German 
agriculture grew significantly slower in the 1930s than in the 1920s or the 1950s.13 
Yet the latest contribution to the debate on the welfare effects of the Nazi economic and 
consumption policies carries the revisionist view to extremes.  In an influential book, the 
historian Götz Aly argues that the Nazi regime bribed ordinary Germans by redistributing 
the wealth taxed from the German rich and looted from the peoples in the occupied 
territories and from European Jewry.  His main argument, the securing of political consent 
by redistribution, is expressed in the book's title, Hitlers Volksstaat (Hitler's people’s 
state).14  While Aly's economic arguments were heavily criticised by Adam Tooze and 
Mark Spoerer,15 his success in the public debate – the book was widely discussed in the 
media and saw its fifth edition two months after initial publication – demonstrates the 
relevance of the issue. 
In this paper, we systematise the findings of different lines of recent research on the 
consumption of consumer goods and add new evidence.  While earlier research has focused 
on describing the policies that affected consumer goods production and consumption we 
assess the results.  We will focus our analysis on food products as they were to a lesser 
extent affected by quality deterioration than other consumer goods.  We investigate in how 
far the Nazis' policies affected actual food consumption by taking the late 1920s and the 
1950s as benchmark periods.  In these two democratic periods, though certainly not free of 
state intervention, food consumption was much less influenced by interventionist 
government policies than in the 1930s. 
                                                 
12  Gustavo Corni (1990), Hitler and the Peasants. Agrarian Policy in the Third Reich, 1930-1939, New York et 
al.: Berg, p. 174. 
13  Stephanie Degler and Jochen Streb (2007), Die verlorene Erzeugungsschlacht: die nationalsozialistische 
Landwirtschaft im Systemvergleich, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no. 2, pp. 161-181. See also Jochen 
Streb and Wolfram Pyta (2005), Von der Bodenproduktivität zur Arbeitsproduktivität. Der 
agrarökonomische Paradigmenwechsel im Dritten Reich, Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und 
Agrarsoziologie, 53, pp. 56-78. 
14  Götz Aly (2005), Hitlers Volksstaat. Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus, Frankfurt on Main: 
Fischer. 
15  Adam Tooze, Economics, Ideology and Cohesion in the Third Reich: A critique of Götz Aly’s "Hitlers 
Volksstaat"  (http://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/academic_staff/further_details/tooze-aly.pdf); Review Spoerer 
on Aly in H-Soz-Kult, 26 May 2005 (http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2005-2-143); 
URLs checked 9 December 2010. 
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As a result, we find that in the 1930s food consumption was affected much stronger than 
hitherto thought.  The diet German households consumed in the 1930s was much more 
frugal than the one consumed in the early 1950s, when GDP and disposable income were 
about the same but when production was less regulated and consumption largely 
unconstrained.  These findings, which pertain to most elementary issues at a time when 
typical worker households still had to devote 45 per cent of their income to buying food, 
leave little room for interpreting the Nazi period as 'modern' or 'social'.  
2.  Nazi Policies Affecting Consumer Goods Consumption:  
An Overview  
It is widely accepted now that the Nazis headed for war right after the takeover of power 
in January 1933.  The priorisation of armaments production was constrained by two 
qualifications which were intertwined with each other.  Firstly, in the beginning of the 
Third Reich, the popularity of the regime was inseparably attached to its ability to reduce 
unemployment which, according to the still too conservative official numbers, attained 
more than 6 million persons (34 per cent of the labour force) in the winter of 1932-33.16  
While this problem was overcome by 1936 when full employment was achieved, the 
second qualification proved to be persistent and of increasing importance the less 
unemployed were still on the dole.  After several years of economic hardship, households 
wanted to have their consumption needs fulfilled.  The regime's trade-off between vigorous 
rearmament and onerous consumer satisfaction led to a policy which has been termed by 
Abelshauser "as much butter as necessary, as many guns as possible".17 
In this conflict between the consumption needs of private households on the one hand and 
those of the state on the other, an obvious measure was to encourage savings.  The German 
state, however, was by far the largest debtor and thus was not willing to increase the 
interest rate.  Hence the only means to increase household savings was moral suasion.  Yet, 
it turned out that this was by far not sufficient to absorb the increasing purchasing power.  
Despite massive propaganda, the savings-income ratio remained remarkably low from 1933 
                                                 
16  Cf. Dan P. Silverman (1998), Hitler's Economy. Nazi Work Creation Programs, 1933-1936, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 251, 253. 
17  Abelshauser (1998), p. 131. 
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to 1937.18 As a consequence, the German authorities increasingly relied on interventionist 
measures that were intended to satisfy the level of consumer needs that was seen as 
sufficient for sustaining political power with as little resources as necessary. 
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate these measures in a stylised way.  The commodity in figure 1a is 
'rationed' in the sense that the German authorities were not willing to have it supplied in 
the quantity at which consumers' willingness to pay equalled producers' willingness to 
supply.  In contrast, a number of commodities can be termed 'recommended' (Figure 1b) in 
the sense that the authorities tried to have the households consume them rather than 
'rationed' goods.  Typical 'rationed' goods were foodstuffs that had to be imported, while 
'recommended' goods could be produced with domestic resources that were of no strategic 
importance for the armaments production.   
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
The curves in bold lines indicate the situation in early 1933 when, after three consecutive 
years of deflation, low prices (p*) cleared the markets.  In the subsequent years, 
employment increased which shifts the demand curve to the right (shift A in Figures 1a 
and 1b).  Right from the beginning the government tried to persuade consumers to 
substitute 'recommended' goods like rye bread, potatoes, fish, apples, sugar, jam and rayon 
textiles for 'rationed' goods like white bread, meat, animal fat, tropical fruits or cotton 
textiles.19  In other words, these measures targeted consumer preferences (shift B).  Less 
subtle government action incurred surplus costs for producers (shift C).  E.g., a quite 
bizarre restriction was the enforced intermixture of (dear) butter into (cheap) margarine. 
This made margarine dearer and less attractive for less affluent consumers.  It also affected 
the supply of butter, itself a rather scarce good, but it helped reducing the import demand 
of the margarine mills for sun flower oil thereby saving scarce foreign exchange.  Another 
                                                 
18  While the average savings-income ratio for the period 1926-29 was 7.0 per cent, the annual figures for 
1933-38 are 2.5, 5.0, 5.6, 4.2, 5.4 and 8.2, respectively.  Savings (excluding those of foreigners) from 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975, Frankfurt on Main: Knapp 1976, p. 4, 
disposable income from Spoerer (2005), pp. 436-438.  In the sources, income data for 1938 include Austria, 
savings data not.  The figure for disposable income in 1938 has thus been transformed to pre-1938 
territory by the net national income data in Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (1941-42), pp. 
604f., which are given for both pre-1938 and 1938 territory. 
19  Cf. Hartmut Berghoff (2001), Enticement and Deprivation: The Regulation of Consumption in Pre-War 
Nazi Germany, in Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton (eds.), The Politics of Consumption. Material 
Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 165-184, here p. 173; 
idem (2003), "Times Change and We Change with Them": The German Advertising Industry in the 
Third Reich—Between Professional Self-Interest and Political Repression, Business History, 45, pp. 128-147. 
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grotesque example is the setup of a national whaling fleet that was to deliver the input for 
train oil, another substitute for sun flower oil.20  Even more interventionist measures were 
direct restrictions on the purchase of input goods, on imports and even on plant 
investment.  Most of these measures have already been described in the 1940s in the 
seminal works of Otto Nathan, Milton Fried and Samuel Lurié.21  A more detailed look on 
the textile industry has recently been provided by Gerd Höschle.22  These restrictions 
result in a kinked supply curve (shift D).  In contrast, the supply of 'recommended goods' 
was fostered by subsidies (shift E).  On the aggregate, restrictive policies outweighed 
supportive measures by far. 
Had the regime stopped here, the combination of increased demand and curtailed supply 
on the markets for 'rationed' goods would inevitably have resulted in price increases.  
Indeed, the prices of many consumer products showed upward tendencies.  Hence the 
Nazis tightened existing price control measures which had been introduced by preceding 
governments.  The story of Nazi price policies is very complicated as a number of 
conflicting aims had to be reconciled. The most notable aims were, on the one hand, the 
political imperative to keep prices stable and, on the other hand, the ambition to increase 
farmers' incomes, which had suffered in the years of deflation.  In a series of articles, André 
Steiner has traced the history of price controls in the 1930s.23   
The picture which emerges from these policies is quite clear.  'Rationed' good markets 
were characterised by controlled prices (p') below market clearing levels (p°).  Since prices 
were bereft their allocation function, queuing and black markets reduced the excess 
demand (e) and solved the allocation problem—the Nazis still shied away from officially 
                                                 
20  Cf. Birgit Pelzer and Reinhold Reith (2001), Margarine. Die Karriere der Kunstbutter, Berlin: Wagenbach, 
pp. 88f. 
21  Nathan and Fried (1944); Lurié (1947). 
22  Gerd Höschle (2004), Die deutsche Textilindustrie zwischen 1933 und 1939. Staatsinterventionismus und 
ökonomische Rationalität, Stuttgart: Steiner. 
23  André Steiner (2006), Von der Preisüberwachung zur staatlichen Preisbildung. Verbraucherpreispolitik 
und ihre Konsequenzen für den Lebensstandard unter dem Nationalsozialismus in der Vorkriegszeit, in 
idem (ed.), Preispolitik und Lebensstandard. Nationalsozialismus, DDR und Bundesrepublik im Vergleich, 
Cologne et al.: Böhlau, pp. 23-85; idem (2006a), Der Brotpreis - ein politischer Preis unter den 
Bedingungen des NS-Regimes, in Johannes Bähr and Ralf Banken (eds.), Wirtschaftssteuerung durch Recht 
im Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Entwicklung des Wirtschaftsrechts im Interventionsstaat des "Dritten 
Reichs", Frankfurt on Main: Klostermann, pp. 365-420. For price policies in public procurement see 
Jochen Streb (2009), Negotiating Contract Types and Contract Clauses in the German Construction 
Industry during the Third Reich, RAND Journal of Economics, 40, pp. 364-379. 
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rationing consumer goods which was not introduced before late August 1939, a few days 
before the raid on Poland. 
While the intense historical research of the past decades has succeeded in describing the 
policies that affected consumer goods production and consumption, the analysis of the 
actual effects on the standard of living has remained underdeveloped.  A start has been 
made by a seminal paper on the biological standard of living by Jörg Baten and Andrea 
Wagner who find that several demographic indicators were quite unfavourable for Nazi 
Germany compared to their Western neighbours.  Moreover, regional shortages of protein 
supply correlated with increases in infant mortality.24  In line with these findings, we 
believe that the degree of failure of German consumption policies in Nazi Germany has 
been underestimated so far.  We ask to what extent German households were forced to 
deviate from the consumption bundle they would have preferred in a less regulated 
economy. 
3.  The Impact of Nazi Policies on Food Consumption  
To what extent did the Nazis' inability to modernise and increase agricultural production, 
the unwillingness to import foodstuffs, the imposition of supply constraints and political 
prices affect private food consumption?  It should be emphasised that in German 
households of the interwar period food expenses still dominated all other expenditure 
issues. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In general, we suppose that, when real GDP and disposable income per capita are 
increasing, households voluntarily substitute high-valued foodstuffs with relatively high 
income elasticity for basic food stuffs with relatively low income elasticity.  Any analysis 
of consumption after 1933, however, is confronted with the problem that it was distorted 
by the government measures discussed in section two.  The multitude of constraints 
imposed on the household's consumption behaviour must have led to numerous 
involuntary substitution effects.  The problem is how to assess changes in the food 
consumption bundle in a world in which price signals do no longer convey valid 
information on how much households value the goods they consume.  
                                                 
24  Cf. Baten and Wagner (2003). 
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To solve this problem we make use of a straightforward benchmark that gives us an idea 
about how consumption would have roughly developed in the absence of Nazi market 
regulation.  Assuming both that the preferences of the German consumers were stable in 
the mid of the 20th century and that preferences in West Germany were not substantially 
different from those of the whole of Germany, the actual consumption pattern of 
Germany in the 1950s should mirror the hypothetical unconstrained consumption of the 
1930s.   
In Table 2 we compare the average per capita food consumption of the calendar years 1927-
28 (=100) with that of 1937-38 and the average of the harvest years 1950-51 and 1951-52.  
The years 1927-28 and 1937-38 are chosen because they were the peak years of the business 
cycles in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, respectively.  In 1951, disposable 
income of private households, which is the best indicator for their consumption potential, 
equalled the respective number of 1937-38 (per capita and in constant prices).25  The 
decisive difference between the years 1937-38 and 1951 is that demand and supply of 
foodstuffs were subjected to substantial regulation in the late 1930s, but much less in the 
early 1950s.  In 1951, when real disposable income per capita was 13 per cent higher than in 
1927-28, German households substituted wheat flour for rye flour and potatoes, and fresh 
and tropical fruits for vegetables.  They also substituted margarine for butter which reflects 
a preference for a cheap spread fat (the role of cholesterols was not yet known).  Under the 
assumption of stable preferences, it is reasonable to expect that German households would 
have liked to consume a similar bundle of foodstuffs in the boom years of the Third Reich 
when real disposable income per capita was as high as in 1951. In Table 3 we have sorted 
the foodstuffs by the increase of their consumption between 1951 and 1927-28, the 
benchmark year (col. ii).  The Table demonstrates that, despite the identical level of real 
disposable income per capita, the consumption pattern in 1937-38 considerably differed 
from the one in the Federal Republic (col. iii).  Per capita consumption of typical inferior 
goods like rye flour products and potatoes was higher, while per capita consumption of 
                                                 
25  In constant prices – which is not unproblematic as the cost of living index was of course influenced by the 
Nazi price policies.  By comparing prices from household surveys that were actually paid with the official 
prices, however, Steiner has argued that the price differences were negligible in the food sector; cf. André 
Steiner (2005), Zur Neuschätzung des Lebenshaltungskostenindex für die Vorkriegszeit des Nationalsozia-
lismus, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no. 2, pp. 129-152. 
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wheat flour products, fresh fruits, tropical fruits, sugar, margarine, full-cream milk and 
vegetables was lower than after the Second World War.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The demand patterns for certain products need a little more explanation.  As the German 
margarine industry relied on imported primary products, the Nazi government severely 
constrained margarine production and subsidised butter production.  In addition to the 
intermixture of butter into margarine, margarine producers were also forced to substitute 
skimmed milk for vegetable oils.26  As margarine production was decreasing consumers 
were forced to buy the dearer butter.  Another rather income-elastic product which was 
consumed in larger quantities in 1937-38 than in 1927-28 and 1951 is meat.27 
Yet, apart from these cases it is clear that rye bread and potatoes were a much more frugal 
diet than white bread, vegetables and fruits.  Obviously, as a result of the regulation of the 
agricultural production, of the food processing industry and of foreign trade, German 
households were forced to spend their income mainly on foodstuffs they preferred less.  If, 
however, the German consumers were forced to substitute rye products for wheat 
products, were they compensated by more meat and butter, and even better off in the end?  
An obvious further step of our analysis is to weight these countervailing effects. 
From a large consumer survey carried through by the German statistical office we know 
the average quantities of the most important foodstuffs consumed by a typical worker 
household in 1927-28.  As the statistical office also recorded the average prices for the most 
important foodstuffs, we are able to calculate the value of the average food consumption 
bundle in 1927-28, which is 863 RM per year.28  After the trough of the economic crisis in 
the early 1930s, real disposable income per capita attained the level of 1927-28 again in 
1935-36.  If we value the actual food consumption bundle of 1935-36 in prices of 1927-28, 
we derive 859 RM.  What is interesting here is not so much that the value of the 1935-36 
                                                 
26  Cf. Pelzer and Reith (2001), pp. 76f. 
27  See for the consumption of meat in a long-term perspective Hans-Jürgen Teuteberg (1998), Der Fleisch- 
und Wurstverzehr der Deutschen in historischer Betrachtung, Ernährungsforschung,  pp. 1-28. Probably 
meat consumption in the early 1950s was still restrained by the depletion of cattle stocks during the war. 
28  Compatible consumption and price data are available for the following foodstuffs, ordered in the rough 
amount of quantities consumed by a typical household: Potatoes, full-cream milk, rye flour products, 
wheat flour products, sugar, margarine, eggs, pork, butter, beef, rice, peas, veal and mutton. – As 
households consumed other food products as well, the amount of 863 RM underestimates the value of the 
full bundle actually consumed. 
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food consumption bundle was slightly below the budget constraint of 1927-28 but that the 
household could have been able to buy the bundle of 1935-36 already in 1927-28 yet 
obviously preferred another one:  white bread rather than rye bread, beef rather than pork, 
fruits and vegetables rather than potatoes.  In other words, the following Table 3 illustrates 
the effects of involuntary substitution. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
If we repeat the same procedure for the food consumption bundle of 1937-38, we derive a 
value of 884 RM in prices of 1927-28.  The question whether or not the households 
preferred this slightly dearer consumption bundle of 1937-38 to the bundle of 1927-28 
cannot be answered with the help of the theory of revealed preferences.29  Figure 2 
illustrates that both cases are possible.  Note, however, that the fact that the bundle 
actually consumed in 1937-38 valued by prices of 1927-28 was 2.5 percent more expensive 
than the bundle of 1927-28 does not automatically imply that the former was preferred to 
the latter.  Figure 2 demonstrates this graphically for a simplified world of just two 
commodities. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The consumption bundles of 1927-28 and 1935-36 are on the same budget line. From the 
theory of revealed preferences we can infer that the bundle of 1927-28 must have been 
preferred by the consumers of the late 1920s to that of 1935-36 as they could have afforded 
this latter bundle as well. Assuming constant preferences we can then conclude that the 
consumers of the year 1935-1936 would have preferred the bundle of 1927-28 as well. In 
order to assess the valuation of the bundle of 1937-38, which is situated at a slightly higher 
budget line, we would need detailed information about the preference ordering (which 
shape the indifference curve30) but which are not available.  Given the distortionary effects 
of the Nazi supply and demand policies in the 1930s we are tempted to assume that the 
bundle of 1937-38 was located below the indifference curve and therefore still inferior to 
that of 1927-28, but without knowledge of the preferences this remains speculation. 
                                                 
29  For the theory of revealed preferences see Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinstin and Jerry R. Green 
(1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford: University Press, pp. 28-36. 
30  In microeconomic consumer theory, the indifference curve shows all consumption bundles that a 
household equally prefers. Below the indifference curve we find all consumption bundles a household 
prefers less than those bundles placed at the indifference curve. 
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A possible objection that we cannot test here is that the regime might have compensated 
consumers for their frugal diet with non-food products such as cloths or better housing.  
However, the complaints about the deteriorating quality of cloths were ubiquitous, and 
quality deterioration was also a problem in residential construction.31   
We can conclude that, at the eve of World War II, the diet of German consumers was at 
most at the pre-crisis level of the late 1920s.  Although American-style mass consumption 
was on the agenda of the regime,32 it failed to improve the standard of living compared to 
1927-28. 
4.  Concluding Remarks  
The evidence presented here supports the more pessimistic view of the standard of living 
under Nazi rule.  In passing we note that the antithesis of "butter" vs. "guns" that has 
occupied the literature on the Nazi economic systems since at least the 1940s does not 
make much sense.  "Butter" is not a suitable metaphor for the consumer demand of the 
1930s as it was more of a 'recommended' product in the sense of Figure 1b than a 'rationed' 
product.  Butter was a product that many households would have liked to replace with 
margarine, which they preferred, and thus is much more a metaphor for consumption 
enforced by the regime.  The challenge was to supply more margarine, not more butter. 
A more important issue is the question of approval of the regime.  If, as we hope to have 
shown, the material standard of living was very modest and if, as Baten and Wagner argue, 
the biological standard of living fell behind that of Western Europe, why did most 
Germans approve the regime?  Recent economic research on happiness and satisfaction 
might help.  As Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer point out, however, important variables that 
are conducive for happiness, apart from material affluence, are political, economic and 
personal freedom, direct political participation and decentralisation,33 issues not very 
prominent in Nazi Germany.   
And probably not among the German people.  As shown in the introduction, it has always 
been debated among economic historians whether the peak of the 1920s upturn or the 
                                                 
31  Cf. Berghoff (2001), pp. 175, 180f.  
32  Cf. Berghoff (2001). 
33  Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer (2002), What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 40, pp. 402-435; idem (2005), Happiness Research: State and Prospects, Review of 
Social Economy, 63, pp. 207-228. 
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traumatic experience of 1931-32 was the reference period for the contemporaries.  Hartmut 
Berghoff has argued that 1932 served as reference period not only for the Nazi propaganda, 
but for most German households as well.  According to Berghoff, another factor 
contributed to the approval of the regime, even among working class people.  The Nazi 
propaganda was quite successful in delivering 'virtual consumption' which served as a 
substitute for real (and restrained) consumption.34   
In our understanding, 'virtual consumption' might be interpreted in two ways.  On the 
one hand, the notion suggests that the Nazis were successful in having consumers defer 
(material) consumption to a future date, e.g. if they participated in the Volkswagen savings 
program which started in August 1938.  At least the more affluent strata of the German 
society may have dreamt that these consumption promises would materialise in the future 
and were in the position to increase their propensity to save.  This might be a reason 
(among others) why the savings-income ratio, which was remarkably low throughout the 
mid-1930s, increased in 1938.35 For the lower class households, probably even for the 
median household, the Volks-products were illusionary.36  Their budget was spent for food, 
rent and clothing and thus for product groups in which the national socialist regime had a 
remarkably modest record.   
On the other hand, 'virtual consumption' may stand for an increase in the consumption of 
public goods which seemingly compensated many households for the mediocre 
consumption possibilities of private goods.  To the list of non-economic variables that Frey 
and Stutzer find important for individual happiness one could add, at least for Germany in 
the 1930s, public goods like national pride (re-militarisation of the Rhineland and Olympic 
Games 1936), economic and (for unpolitical and 'aryan' citizens) political stability.  In 
particular, economic stability may have played a very important role after the shocking 
experiences of the hyperinflation 1923 and the great slump of 1931 and 1932.  The 
frustrating answer of why so many Germans supported the Nazi regime may simply be 
that German households were willing to trade utility from material consumption and 
human rights for lower socioeconomic risks and national pride. 
                                                 
34  Berghoff (2001), p. 173;  idem (2007), Neue Kontroversen zur Konsumgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus, 
Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 58, pp. 502-518, here pp. 509, 518. 
35  See fn. 18 below. 
36  Cf. Wolfgang König (2004), Volkswagen, Volksempfänger, Volksgemeinschaft: "Volksprodukte" im Dritten 
Reich: Vom Scheitern einer nationalsozialistischen Konsumgesellschaft, Paderborn: Schöningh, pp. 258-262. 
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Table 1  Expenditure Shares of Various Household Types, 1927-28 
Household type, annual income Food Habitation Clothing Other 
Blue collar      
  < 2,500 RM 48 19 10 23 
  > 4,300 RM 42 17 5 36 
White collar     
  < 3,000 RM 42 22 11 25 
  > 6,100 RM 28 21 13 38 
Civil servants     
  < 3,000 RM 43 22 12 23 
  > 10,000 RM 22 24 12 42 
Source: Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), Die Lebenshaltung von 2000 Arbeiter-, Angestellten und 
Beamtenhaushaltungen. Erhebungen von Wirtschaftsrechnungen im Deutschen Reich von 1927/28, vol. I, 
Berlin: Hobbing, pp. 20, 32, 43. 
Table 2 Real Disposable Income per Capita and per Capita Food Consumption in 
Germany, 1927-28=100 
Year Third Reich  
∅ 1937-38 
(i) 
Federal Republic  
1951 
(ii) 
(i) in per  
cent of (ii) 
(iii) 
Real income per 
capita 
112 113 
  99 
Skimmed milk 308 195 158 
Fresh fruits   98 145   68 
Margarine   85 139   62 
Tropical fruits   77 128   61 
Sugar 104 114   91 
Wheat flour 
products 
  90 108 
  84 
Eggs 111 103 108 
Potatoes 102   99 103 
Total fat   96   97   99 
Full-cream milk   92   97   95 
Vegetables   93   93   99 
Beef 107   77 138 
Butter 122   76 161 
Total meat 106   73 145 
Pork 104   72 144 
Rye flour products 105   65 161 
 
Notes: 1927-28: Germany without Saarland; 1937-38: Germany with Saarland and without Austria; 1951: 
Federal Republic of Germany with Berlin (West) and without Saarland. 
Sources:  
Consumption: Dieter Grupe (1957), Die Nahrungsmittelversorgung Deutschlands seit 1925. Eine Auswertung 
der einschlägigen Statistiken zu vergleichbaren Versorgungsbilanzen, Hanover: Strothe, pp. II.88f.    
Prices: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (1933), p. 251, (1935), p. 271; Vierteljahrshefte zur 
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1938), p. II.140, (1940), p. II:80; Statistisches Handbuch für Deutschland (1949), 
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p. 467.  
Disposable income: calculated for the interwar period from Albrecht Ritschl (2002), Deutschlands Krise 
und Konjunktur 1924-1934. Binnenkonjunktur, Auslandsverschuldung und Reparationsproblem zwischen 
Dawes-Plan und Transfersperre, Berlin: Akademie, Tables A12, B1, B2 and B5, and Walther G. Hoffmann 
and J. Heinz Müller (1959), Das deutsche Volkseinkommen 1851-1957, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 43, 47, 
49, 54; for 1950-55 from Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1953), p. 451, (1956), pp. 
377, 398, (1954), p. 403, (1957), p. 418, and (1958), p. 481. 
 
Table 3 Involuntary Substitution: Real Disposable Income per Capita and per 
Capita Food Consumption in Germany, 1935-36 vs. 1927-28 change in per 
cent) 
Year ∅ 1935-36 
Real income per 
capita  
    -1 
Skimmed milk +168 
Butter  +13 
Rye flour products    +5 
Pork    +3 
Potatoes    +1 
Total meat   ± 0 
Eggs   ± 0 
Sugar     -1 
Vegetables     -5 
Total fat     -5 
Full-cream milk     -8 
Fresh fruits     -8 
Margarine     -8 
Tropical fruits     -9 
Wheat flour 
products 
    -9 
Beef     -9 
Notes: 1927-28: Germany without Saarland; 1937-38: Germany with Saarland and without Austria. 
Sources: Grupe (1957), pp. II.88f. 
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Figure 1a Policy measures to restrict the consumption of a 'rationed' good 
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Figure 1b  Policy measures to encourage the consumption of a 'recommended' good 
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Figure 2  Food consumption bundles of 1927-28, 1935-36 and 1937-38 valued by 
prices of 1927-28 
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